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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE POPP, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ARIE PETER ROTH and GERARDA 
ROTH, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
\ 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case 
No. 8956 
The plaintiff and appellant, George Popp, will be referred 
to throughout this brief as plaintiff, and the defendants and 
respondents, Arie Peter Roth and Gerarda Roth, will be re-
ferred to as defendants or by name. 
This appeal arises out of a complaint for writ of habeas 
corpus brought by plaintiff against defendants to determine 
whether Lore Popp, the alleged minor child of plaintiff, was 
illegally or unlawfully restrained by the defendants. The de-
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fendants answered by denying that the minor' child was illegall~ 
or unlawfully restrained, and alleging that the child wa: 
illegitimate and properly placed with defendants by the natura 
mother for the purposes of adoption. 
The trial court determined that plaintiff was not entitlec 
to custody of the child, and that the custody of defendants wa~ 
lawful. This appeal is taken from said judgment and determi. 
nation. 
The trial in this matter was held on three days, to-wit: 
January 14 and 15, and June 27, 1958. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant immigrated to the United States of AmeriG 
from West Germany in July of 1955, and became a resident oJ 
Peoria, Illinois (R. 44). The plaintiff is still a resident oJ 
Peoria. 
The appellant first met Winifred Fleischmann (later hi: 
wife) in Germany shortly after World War II (R. 40), anc 
commenced keeping company with one another socially in 195• 
(R. 40-44). During the month of October, 1954, plaintif 
and \V'inifred Fleischmann had sexual relations (R. 43) 
\vhich, according to plaintiff, resulted in Winifred becominJ 
pregnant (R. 45-46) .Winifred left Germany arriving in th 
United States February 1, 1955, and became a resident o 
Peoria, Illinois (R. 100). She gave birth to the minor child 
Lore, at Peoria on the 15th day of June, 1955 (R. 44). 
Prior to coming to the United States, plaintiff institute 
divorce proceedings against the then Mrs. Popp at Nurnber! 
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Germany, and a divorce was granted Mrs. Popp upon her 
"Countercomplaint" (R. 149). A translation of the Final 
Decree was received in evidence in the instant action (Exhibit 
D-4) . On the basis of oral arguments before the German Court, 
on June 21, 1955, the court made, inter alia, the following 
"Final Decree": 
"II. The marriage of the parties contracted before the 
Registrar's Office Nurnberg is dissolved upon the 
Countercomplaint.'' 
The determination of the German Court was issued June 28, 
1955. Elsewhere in Exhibit D-4, the statement appears as 
follows: 
"II. It is hereby certified that the above Decree becomes 
legally effective as of November 21, 1955." 
After Winifred located a sponsor for him pursuant to 
immigration requirements plaintiff left Germany for the United 
States (R. 46). Plaintiff and Winifred Fleischmann were 
married at Peoria, Illinois, July 23, 1955. 
On the 8th day of February, 1957, plaintiff and his wife, 
Winifred, made application by paternity affidavits to the State 
of Illinois requesting that a certificate of birth be prepared 
and filed showing the minor child, Lore, to be the legitimate 
child of George C. and Winifred Popp, and have the name 
"Lore Walburga Popp" (R. 184; Exhibits D-9 and D-10). 
Pursuant to these applications, the State of Illinois caused a 
new birth certificate to be issued and filed showing Lore to be 
the legitimate daughter of George C. Popp and Winifred 
Fleischmann Popp, which certificate is dated February 13, 
1957 (R. 55; Exhibit P-2). 
5 
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The plaintiff testified that he was advised by Winifred 
that he was the father of Lore (R. 46) ; that after their mar-
riage, he and Winifred went to the Peoria County Court House 
to make application to have the birth certificate changed to 
reflect that he was the father of Lore ( R. 48-49) . 
Plaintiff, Winifred, the child Lore, and a new daughter, 
Elizabeth, continued to live together as a family until Sep-
tember, 1957, when Winifred told plaintiff that she wanted 
to leave him (R. 49-50). Winifred left the home at Peoria 
taking the child, Lore, to Salt Lake City, Utah, leaving the 
younger child, Elizabeth, with plaintiff at Peoria (R. 50). 
Approximately 14 days later, he received a phone call from 
Winifred, who indicated that she wanted to place Lore for 
adoption (R. 50-51). Plaintiff refused her request (R. 51). 
During the conversation Winifred asked plaintiff, "if you have 
to sign some papers, will you sign some papers" (R. 50, 111-
112, 124-125). Subsequendy, Winifred did not advise plaintiff 
of the adoption "Because I just wasn't interested in calling 
him or writing him" (R. 125). 
Following the phone conversation, plaintiff next heard 
from Winifred about November 1, 1957, receiving a letter 
post-marked "San Francisco," advising that she and Lore were 
in San Francisco (R. 51, 54, 109), and she subsequently told 
plaintiff that "Lore remained in San Francisco" (R. 109). 
Another letter arrived "Saturday after Christmas," (R. 51), 
prompting plaintiff to see a lawyer in Peoria (R. 53). He left 
for Salt Lake City, arriving January 1, 1958 (R. 53). On that 
date he located Winifred, and in reply to his inquiry to Lore's 
whereabouts, Winifred variously stated that Lore was in San 
Francisco and Florida (R. 53, 54, 109, 110). 
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In October, 1957, Winifred placed the child with de-
fendants for purposes of adoption. On October 25, 1957, one 
Jf the judges of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, made and entered an order 
placing said child with defendants for the purposes of adoption. 
The testimony of Winifred Popp, at the adoption proceeding, 
was published in this action (R. 103) and made a part of the 
record (R. 16-22). She testified that plaintiff, though admittedly 
married to her on July 23, 1955, was not the father of the 
child (R. 17). Winifred executed her consent to the adoption 
before the court (R. 18). Upon the basis of Winifred's 
testimony the court, in the adoption proceeding, made the 
following remarks: 
"THE COURT: As the Court sees the situation, 
George C. Popp has no claim upon the child. 
* * * * 
"The Court makes an order from the evidence now 
before the Court that George C. Popp has no legal 
claim upon this child and that the proceedings for the 
petitioners may be held at this time. 
* * * * 
"THE COURT: The Court also finds from the evi-
dence that this is an illegitimate child which entitles 
us to proceed without any regard to the natural father 
of the child. 
* * * * 
"THE COURT: As I view the matter and if I were 
doing it, I would take the view that whatever proceed-
ings were had in Illinois would be defective and place 
upon him the burden of going forward to assert any 
claim he might have and upon her testimony a decree 
will be issued giving the adopting parents temporary 
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custody for the purpose of a year to lapse and in that 
connection we will make a finding that George C. Popp 
has no legal claim upon' the child in this case" (R. 
18, 19). 
The plaintiff, admittedly, was not given notice of the 
adoption proceedings, nor did he ever consent to said adoption 
(R. 55). 
The plaintiff testified that he came to Salt Lake City for the 
express purpose of recovering custody of Lore (R. 70). 
Winifred Popp did not notify plaintiff that she was placing 
Lore for adoption (R. 81). She further testified that plaintiff 
treated the child unfairly by putting her to bed at 5:00 o'clock 
(R. 88), hitting her when she cried (R. 88, 101), by not allow-
ing her toys (R. 89), and by leaving the children at home 
without a sitter for "an hour or two" (R. 103, 118). She 
testified further that "she talked to him" about his purported 
cruelty to the children (R. 120), but that she did not file a 
divorce or take any action against him in Illinois (R. 120). 
She left the children with plaintiff five evenings a week while 
she was working (R. 120). She admitted that plaintiff bought 
all the groceries and they were never hungry (R. 124), and 
that they lived in an apartment with a fenced yard and tele-
vision (R. 89). 
Plaintiff denied striking the child on the face, but stipu-
lated to "spanking" her on the "hind end" when "she needed 
a spanking " (R. 134). He conceded striking the child on one 
occasion hard enough to bruise her when she climbed from 
her crib and fell to the floor, to remind her of the danger 
involved (R. 135). He bought the children's clothes and toys 
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(R. 136-137). He put the children to bed at 7:00-8:00 o'clock 
p.m. (R. 138). He loves Lore and wants to take the child 
back to Peoria (R. 140). No one has ever complained to him 
about his treatment of the children (R. 138). The plaintiff 
described the physical relation of his apartment to his neighbor, 
and advised that when he left the apartment while Winifred 
was at work, he made certain the neighbors looked in and 
kept a watch on the children, and that the neighbors could 
easily hear any crying or disturbance through the thin walls 
(R. 137, 142). 
Lydia Fleischmann, sister of Winifred, testified on behalf 
of defendant, that she had lived in the home of plaintiff and 
his wife for two weeks in August, 1957, and visited their home 
occasionally when she lived elsewhere in Peoria (R. 176-177); 
that she saw plaintiff strike the child in the face when she was 
five month old (R. 170) ; that she saw "black and blue marks" 
on Lore's face when she was visiting plaintiff's home some-
time in 1957 (R. 170-171); that when she was visiting with 
plaintiff in August, 195 7, plaintiff went out "practically every 
night" (R. 171); and that she saw him with other women 
(R. 173). 
Winifred Popp was recalled as a witness for defendants 
at the last hearing of June 27, 1958, and in reply to questions 
of counsel for defendants, stated that she was then residing 
with plaintiff at Peoria and intended to reconcile (R. 185-
186). 
9 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF RIGHTFULLY 
AND LAWFULLY IS ENTITLED TO THE CUSTODY OF 
THE MINOR CHILD, LORE POPP, AND THE CHILD 
PRESENTLY IS ILLEGALLY AND UNLAWFULLY RE" 
STRAINED BY THE DEFENDANTS. 
A. THE CHILD, LORE POPP, COULD NOT LAW-
FULL Y BE ADOPTED BY THE DEFENDANTS 
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF PLAINTIFF, AND 
HAVING FAILED TO SECURE SAID CONSENT 
THE CUSTODY OF THE DEFENDANTS MUST 
BE DEEMED UNLAWFUL AND WITHOUT 
RIGHT. 
B. THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE 
SECOND MARRIAGE OF PLAINTIFF TO WINI-
FRED POPP AS A MATTER OF LAW HAS NOT 
BEEN REBUTTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINC-
ING EVIDENCE OF INVALIDITY. 
i) THE STATUS AND VALIDITY OF A MAR-
RIAGE CONTRACT AND THE STATUS OF 
LEGITIMACY OF OFFSPRING MUST BE DE-
TERMINED BY THE LAW OF ILLINOIS, THE 
DOMICILIARY STATE. 
ii) A VALID MARRIAGE AND LEGITIMACY 
HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE LAWS 
OF ONE STATE, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED 
BY ALL STATES. 
10 
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C. ASSUMING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF PLAIN-
TIFF TO \VINIFRED POPP WAS CONTRACTED 
AT PEORIA, ILLINOIS, DURING THE INTER-
LOCUTORY PERIOD OF A PRE-EXISTING GER-
MAN DECREE OF DIVORCE, THE MARRIAGE 
NONETHELESS WAS VALID AND LAWFUL. 
D. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO ONLY, THAT 
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY THE PAR-
TIES IN ILLINOIS WAS VOID, THE STATUS OF 
THE MINOR CHILD IS LEGITIMATE WITHIN 
THE MEANINGS OF ILLINOIS STATUTES AND 
BY REASON OF PUBLIC POLICY. 
POINT II 
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF IS A FIT AND 
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE CONTROL AND CUS-
TODY OF HIS MINOR CHILD, LORE POPP. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF RIGHTFULLY 
AND LAWFULLY IS ENTITLED TO THE CUSTODY OF 
THE !vfiNOR CHILD, LORE POPP, AND THE CHILD 
PRESENTLY IS ILLEGALLY AND UNLAWFULLY RE-
STRAINED BY THE DEFENDANTS. 
A. THE CHILD, LORE POPP, COULD NOT LAW-
FULL Y BE ADOPTED BY THE DEFENDANTS 
11 
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WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF PLAINTIFF, AND 
HAVING FAILED TO SECURE SAID CONSENT 
THE CUSTODY OF THE DEFENDANTS MUST 
BE DEEMED UNLAWFUL AND WITHOUT 
RIGHT. 
The evidence is clear to the effect that adoption proceed-
ings were commenced in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County, and that an order was made granting 
custody of Lore Popp to the defendants (See transcript of 
proceedings, dated October 23, 1957, R.16-22). Likewise, it 
is apparent that no consent was executed or given by plaintiff 
to the proceedings placing the child, Lore, for adoption. 
Indeed, the court observed that the child was "illegitimate" 
and that plaintiff herein "has no legal claim upon this child" 
(R. 19). And, this conclusion was reached by the court upon 
the basis of Winifred's testimony that she had not married 
the natural father (R. 17}, although a finding was made by that 
court that Winifred was married to plaintiff (R. 143). At no 
time in the adoption proceeding was the court concerned that 
plaintiff herein might have been, in fact, the natural father, 
to warrant giving notice or securing his consent to the adoption. 
This cavalier action constituted a real and awesome judicial 
abrogation of personal rights. 
Defendants are holding the child, Lore, in their custody 
under color of right having its basis in the adoption proceed-
ings. It is submitted that the order placing the child for 
adoption is a sham and not in compliance with the law. 
Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. provides 
that a "legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent 
12 
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of the parents, if living * * * ." Our entire problem revolves 
around the word "legitimate," for if the child, Lore, is legiti-
mate, as that term is used in our statute, the action of the court 
in placing the child patently was unlawful. 
Plaintiff contends that the child was legitimated by a 
subsequent marriage of the parents, that the plaintiff ac-
knowledged the child as his, and that he took the child into 
his home and treated her as his lawful child. The competent 
evidence shows that plaintiff and Winifred entered into a 
marriage considered lawful in Illinois. The plaintiff and 
Winifred made application, pursuant to Illinois law, to change 
the birth records of the child to reflect them to be the parents, 
and thereby legitimate the child. This action, it is submitted, 
was sufficient to legitimate the child so as to require plaintiff's 
consent to an adoption. 
Succinctly stated, defendants contend that the second 
marriage can be attacked collaterally, that the second marriage 
was absolutely void, and, that the child is illegitimate, not-
withstanding the efforts made or that might be made by the 
plaintiff and his wife to legitimate the child. It is concluded 
by defendants that the child is "illegitimate" as that term is 
used in our statute, supra, to obviate plaintiff's consent. 
B. THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE 
SECOND MARRIAGE OF PLAINTIFF TO WINI-
FRED POPP AS A MATTER OF LAW HAS NOT 
BEEN REBUTTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINC-
ING EVIDENCE OF INVALIDITY. 
The presumption in favor of validity of a second marriage 
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is one of the strongest presumptions known to the law (35 
Am. Jur., Marriage, Sec. 192), and this is especially so where 
the legitimacy of children is attacked (see annotation, 14 
A.L.R. 2d 7). As stated in Anderson v. Anderson, ( 121 Utah 
237, 240 P. 2d 966, 967): 
" * * * the presumption of validity of the second 
marriage 'is one of the strongest disputable presump-
tions known in law' " (citing In re Pilcher's Estate, 114 
Utah 72, 197 P. 2d 143). 
In Re Biersack, 96 Misc. 161, 159 NYS 519, affirmed 
179 App. Div. 916, 165 NYS 1077, where the legitimacy of 
a child depended upon the validity of a second marriage it 
was held that the presumption is in favor of legitimacy, as 
well as the marriage, and that it would prevail unless the 
rebutting evidence was clear and irrefragable proof of every 
element of fact necessary to defeat the presumption. The 
decision further pointed out that the evidence must not only 
establish the fact and validity of the earlier marriage, bui 
exclude every basis which might conceivably rescue the second 
marriage from invalidity (see also Welch v. All Persons, 78 
Mont. 370, 254 Pac. 179; Tompkins v. Commonwealth, 117 
Ky. 138, 77 S.W. 712; Fowler v. Texas Exploration Co., (Tex. 
1926) 290 S.W. 818; State v. Rocker, 130 Iowa 239, 107 N.W. 
645; Bowman v. Little, 101 Md. 273, 61 A. 223). 
Where the fact of a second marriage is shown, the sub-
sequent marriage is sufficient to raise the presumption that 
the first marriage was terminated by divorce. For reasons of 
applicability of the doctrines of conflicts of law, as will be 
pointed out below, the courts of Illinois have applied this 
14 
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presumption (See Matthews v. Jones ( 1945, CA 5th Cir.) 
149 F. 2d 893; Re Estate of Panico (1932) 268 Ill. App. 585; 
Winter v. Dubble, 251 Ill. 200, 95 NE 1093; See also Re 
Pilcher's Estate, supra). 
The plaintiff is quite willing to agree that the presumption 
in favor of the second marriage is not conclusive to the point 
that plenary proof is necessary. The rebuttal evidence must, 
however, be sufficiently clear and conclusive as fairly to pre-
clude any other result (Kolombatovich v. Magma Copper Co., 
43 Ariz. 314, 30 P. 2d 832). As stated by this Honorzble 
Court in Anderson v. Anderson, supra, the evidence must be 
"clear and convincing" (at 968). 
i) THE STATUS AND VALIDITY OF A MAR-
RIAGE CONTRACT AND THE STATUS OF 
LEGITIMACY OF OFFSPRING MUST BE DE-
TERMINED BY THE LAW OF ILLINOIS, THE 
DOMICILIARY STATE. 
For our purposes here, we must examine the validity of 
plaintiff's second marriage and the legitimacy of the child, 
Lore, by the law of Illinois. The marriage was performed and 
consummated at Peoria, Illinois; the child was born there; 
and, the family resided there at all times material hereto. 
The validity of a marriage must be determined by the law 
of the place where it is entered into ( 15 C.J.S., Conflict of 
Laws, Sec. 16C; In re Sanders Estate (Calif., 1957) 305 P. 
2d 655; Craddock's Case, 310 Mass. 116, 37 N.E. 2d 508, 
146 A.L.R. 116; Scott v. Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W. 2d 
627, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1431; Owen v. Owen, 127 Colo. 359, 257 
15 
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P. 2d 581; 43 A.L.R. 2d 1081). Moreover, a marriage valid 
where consummated is valid everywhere (HeRinger v. Heflin-
ger, 136 Va. 289, 11.8 S.E. 316, 32 A.L.R. 1088; Hoagland 
v. Hoagland, 27 Wyo. 178, 193 Pac. 843, 32 A.L.R. 1104). 
By the same token, the laws of the state of domicile of 
the father, mother, and child fixes the legitimacy of the child 
(Kowalski v. Wojtowski, 19 N.J. 247, 116 A. 2d 6, 53 A.L.R. 
2d 556). Once legitimated under the laws of the domicil, this 
status is retained through life by the child wherever it may 
go (11 Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, Sec. 17, citing Mund v. 
Rehaume, 51 Colo. 129, 117 Pac. 159; 15 C.J.S .. Conflict of 
Laws, Sec. 16 h.) 
ii) A VALID MARRIAGE AND LEGITIMACY 
HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE LAWS 
OF ONE STATE, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED 
BY ALL STATES. 
It must be assumed that plaintiff and Winifred Popp 
entered into a marriage lawful in form and ceremony, and 
did comply with the laws of the State of Illinois. It might be 
noted again that the court in the adoption proceedings made a 
finding that the marriage had been consummated. The testi-
mony of plaintiff, coupled with documentary evidence received 
at the trial, establish this fact beyond doubt. Chapter 3. Section 
163, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953, provides, in this regard: 
·'An illegitimate child whose parents intermarry and 
is acknowledged by the father as the father's child shall 
be considered legitimate.'' 
Assuming then, no other disabling factor, the marriage 
16 
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performed in Illinois was sufficient to cloak the child, Lore, 
with the respectability of legitimacy, and having attached can 
not be undone (see also Miller v. Pennington, 218 Ill. 220, 
75 N.E. 919). 
A certified copy of the birth certificate of the child was 
received in evidence (Exhibit P-2) designating plaintiff and 
Winifred Popp as the parents of Lore, which certificate was 
granted after compliance with Illinois law requiring docu-
mentary evidence of paternity and marriage (Exhibits D-9 
and D-10), and which certificate is issued "in the same form 
as certificate of birth for a legitimate child" (Chapter 111 Yz, 
Sec. 48b, Ill. Rev. Stat., 195 3). By issuing this certificate in 
compliance with Illinois statutes the child is treated as legiti-
mate, and it must be presumed that such action was taken in 
accordance with law. 
C. ASSUMING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF PLAIN-
TIFF TO WINIFRED POPP WAS CONTRACTED 
AT PEORIA, ILLINOIS, DURING THE INTER-
LOCUTORY PERIOD OF A PRE-EXISTING GER-
MAN DECREE OF DIVORCE, THE MARRIAGE 
NONETHELESS WAS VALID AND LAWFUL. 
Although the marriage consummated at Peoria, Illinois, 
by plaintiff and Winifred Popp, has every apparent advantage 
of legality, still it has been contended that the decree of the 
German Court should be construed so as to treat it as void. 
This effort is made in order to convert a child, legitimate by 
the law of Illinois, into an illegitimate child to justify the 
purposes of the adoption proceeding. This action smacks of 
17 
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unfairness and is destructive of the sanctity of marriage and 
family. 
The German Decree has two statements which have a 
material bearing upon the dissolution of the prior marriage, 
as follows: 
"II. The marriage of the parties contracted before the 
Registrar's Office Nurnberg is dissolved upon the 
Countercomplaint. (Emphasis supplied.) 
* * * * 
"II. It is hereby certified that the above Decree becomes 
legally effective as of November 21, 1955." 
Significantly, the former provision bearing the date, June 
28, 1955, clearly purports to dissolve the marriage, whereas 
the latter provision postpones the effective date of the disso-
lution for reasons unknown. The latter provision is not 
unlike interlocutory proscriptions on remarriage common to 
many states of the United States. But, this is not to say that 
such proscriptions delay the dissolution of the marriage. 
In the absence of continental authorities upon the extra-
territorial effect of such a restraint on remarriage, the situation 
is best compared with construction of such a restraint by our 
own courts. 
Our situation can be compared with a divorce granted in 
one state containing a prohibition against remarriage or a 
statement postponing the effective date of the decree during a 
prescribed period of time, and where one of the parties moves 
to another state and remarries while the proscription is extant. 
It is of significance that the party usually changes his domicile 
18 
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to the second state and does not go there for the express purpose 
of evading the marriage restraint imposed by the first state. 
As a general proposition it uniformly is held that a 
marriage is valid according to the law of the place where it 
was celebrated, notwithstanding that at the time thereof one 
of the parties is subject to an inhibition against remarriage 
imposed by the decree of divorce or by statute of the state 
where a previous divorce was granted (In Re Sanders Estate 
(Calif., 1957), 305 P. 2d 655; Packard v. Packard (Iowa, 
1950) 45 N.W. 2d 269; Criss v. Industrial Commission, 348 
Ill. 75, 18 N.E. 572; see annotations, 32 A.L.R. 1142, 51 
A.L.R. 325; see generally People v. Woodley, 22 Cal. App. 
674, 136 Pac. 312; Bauer v. Abrahams, 73 Colo. 509, 216 
Pac. 259; Green v. McDowell, 210 Mo. App. 517, 242 S.W. 
168; Dimpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 329, 68 Atl. 561; and 
Goodwin v. Goodwin (N.Y.) 142 N.Y. Supp. 1102). Where 
it was not the intention of the person under the disability 
simply to avoid the law of the divorce state, and where he 
intends to establish domicile in the marriage state, such mar-
riage is valid and unassailable (Owen v. Owen, 178 Wise. 
609, 190 N.W. 363). As stated in Harvey v. Oklahoma (Okla., 
1925), 298 Pac. 862, 51 A.L.R. 321: 
" * * * It is generally held that the inhibition in a 
decree of divorce has no extraterritorial effect, and is 
enforceable only in the State where the divorce is 
granted, and that outside of such State the marriage 
is generally treated as valid, although there is some 
division in the authorities.'' 
Also to the effect that a restraint on remarriage has no extra-
territorial effect see Boyles v. Wallace, 208 Ala. 213, 93 So. 
19 
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908; Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N.Y. 313, 165 N.E. 460, 61 A.L.R. 
1523; Yeats v. S. (Okla.), 236 Pac. 62; Plummer v. Davis 
(Okla.), 36 P. 2d 938; and People v. Woodley, 22 Cal. App. 
674, 136 Pac. 312, which also looked to the law of the place 
of marriage to determine validity. 
In Bauer v. Abrahams, supra, the Colorado Supreme Court 
treated with a situation identical to the case at bar. In that 
case a divorce was obtained in Kansas, which Decree provided 
that the marriage was "dissolved," but "that the decree does 
not become absolute and take effect until the expiration of six 
months from said time." During the six-month period, a 
marriage was consummated by one of the parties in New 
Mexico, and the marriage was determined to be valid. And 
being valid where consummated in New Mexico, it must be 
given full force and effect everywhere (see Willey v. Willey, 
22 Wash. 115, 60 Pac. 145). 
In re Sanders (Calif. 1957) 305 P. 2d 655, a petition was 
brought to remove an administrator of the estate on the ground 
that the marriage of the administrator and deceased was void 
because of a prior existing marriage. The marriage in question 
had taken place while one party was under a disability im-
posed by a divorce obtained in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma 
statute prohibited remarriage during a six-month interlocutory 
period, and also provided that the decree would not take 
effect until six months after the judgment. The California 
court stated that the disabling features of the Oklahoma 
statute had no extraterritorial effect; accordingly, the marriage 
\vas valid where consummated outside of Oklahoma. 
20 
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In a 1950 decision, the Iowa Supreme Court construed the 
following Kansas statute: 
"Every decree of divorce shall recite the day and date 
when the judgment was rendered in the cause, and that 
the decree does not become absolute and take effect 
until the expiration of six months from said time" 
(Sec. 60-1514). 
One of the parties to a Kansas divorce subject to and during 
this disabling feature, remarried in Iowa. The Iowa court 
held that when a person remarries during this period in an-
other state where the marriage is not unlawful it will be 
upheld as a legal marriage, viewing the prior marriage as dis-
solved when granted (Pickard v. Pickard, supra, citing 
Wheelock v. Freiwald (8th Cir.) 66 F. 2d 694, 700). 
The Illinois courts have subscribed to the doctrine that 
extraterritorial effect will not be given to disabling periods in 
divorce decrees. In Criss t'. Industrial Commission, 348 Ill. 
75, 180 N.E. 572, the Illinois Supreme Court examined the 
extraterritorial effect of an Alabama divorce decree which 
provided that in no event was a party to the divorce to remarry 
before the expiration of sixty days after the decree. In addition 
the Alabama code provided that a decree without personal 
service is not absolute for twelve months inasmuch as the 
divorce can be set aside within that period should the defaulted 
defendant discover the divorce. The Illinois court held that 
the presumption was in favor of the validity of a marriage 
consummated in Illinois a few days after the Alabama decree 
of divorce was granted, as the marriage was not prohibited 
by Illinois Jaw. The Illinois Supreme Court further observed 
that unless the prohibition upon remarriage was expressly 
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prohibitive of remarriage in another state, the remarriage 
provision applied only in Alabama. 
And in Van Voorhis v. Brinthall, 86 N. Y. 18, 40 Am. 
Rep. 505, it was held that although a decree of divorce granted 
in New York forbade remarriage of the husband, the children 
of his subsequent marriage celebrated in another state where 
it was valid were legitimate in New York although such 
marriage would have been invalid if celebrated in New York. 
The reluctance of courts to give extraterritorial effect to 
such proscription, is because of the strong public policy in 
favor of the validity of marriage (see Note, 26 Harvard Law 
Review 536). Professor Joseph H. Beale, in an article entitled 
Marriage and the Domicile, in 54 Harvard Law Review 501, 
writes concerning prohibition upon remarriage, at 517: 
" * * * But the application of this injunction to a 
marriage contracted abroad would result in the bas-
tardization of its issue as well as in a declaration that 
the parties are living in a state of concubinage. This 
Pyrrhic victory can hardly justify the common law in 
classing these unions with incest and polygamy, and 
the courts have usually so held when faced with the 
question." 
The evidence tending to show a proscription against re-
marriage and postponing the effective date of the decree would 
not be sufficient in the instant case, as a matter of law, to rebut 
the presumption of the validity of the second marriage. By 
any fair and sensible construction, the German divorce decree 
presents an ambiguous result. In the first instance, the divorce 
is clearly terminated when granted by the language of the 
decree; thereafter, the effective date of the divorce is postponed. 
22 
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The postponement reasonably can be explained as a method 
to preserve an appeal, a social effort to discourage divorce 
actions followed by hasty remarriages, or a cooling off period 
intended to reconcile the parties. Moreover, under any con-
struction, it is doubted that the couple could cohabit together 
during the interlocutory period. 
To decline to give extraterritorial effect to the interlocutory 
period of the German decree can only be consonent with whole-
some public policy. This Honorable Court can restore to Lore 
Popp the cloak of legitimacy and honor which was stripped 
from her by the trial court against the evidence and the law, 
and this laudable action would be in conformity with the 
great majority of state decisions upon the subject. Such a 
result would also save plaintiff from the stigma of having 
committed the crimes of bigamy and unlawful cohabitation, 
not to mention the legitimacy of the second child born to 
plaintiff and Winifred Popp. 
D. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO ONLY, THAT 
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY THE PAR-
TIES IN ILLINOIS WAS VOID, THE STATUS OF 
THE MINOR CHILD IS LEGITIMATE WITHIN 
THE MEANINGS OF ILLINOIS STATUTES AND 
BY REASON OF PUBLIC POLICY. 
Two Illinois statutes, when construed jointly, would 
assure the legitimacy of the minor child even though it were 
concluded, as a matter of law, that the marriage ceremony at 
Peoria, Illinois, was of no lawful effect. 
As indicated hereinabove, Chapter 3, Section 163, Ill. 
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Rev. Stat., 1953, considers a child legitimate where the parents 
intermarry and is acknowledged by the father as the father's 
child. Chapter 89, Section 17a, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953, provides 
in substance that where two parties have attempted by a lawful 
form of marriage ceremony in apparent compliance with law 
to be joined in marriage and cohabit together as husband and 
wife, and there is issue born of such cohabitation, issue is 
legitimate although the attempted marriage is declared void 
or might be declared void. 
Reading these statutes together, and applying their spirit 
and meaning to the instant case, assuming the marriage to be 
void or voidable, it would be consistent with public policy 
to treat the child, Lore, as legitimate. In a sense she is issue 
of a marriage, though the marriage was celebrated subsequent 
to her birth. And she is legitimate for all purposes, including 
the requirement that the consent of the plaintiff be secured 
to any contemplated adoption of the child in Utah. 
This result is wholesome and saves the child from the 
stigma of bastardy and the errors of the parents. Being 
remedial, the legitimation statutes are ordinarily construed 
liberally by the courts (see Note, Status of Issue of Void 
Marriages, 56 Harvard Law Review 624). 
POINT II 
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF IS A FIT AND 
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE CONTROL AND CUS-
TODY OF HIS MINOR CHILD, LORE POPP. 
24 
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Viewing all the competent evidence in a light most favor-
able to defendants, it is submitted as a matter of law that 
the plaintiff is a fit and proper person to have the custody 
of his minor child, Lore Popp. 
At the first hearing on this matter before the trial court, 
Winifred testified in substance that plaintiff had upon occasion 
struck the child, and had manifested rather strict parental 
discipline and control over the child. It is apparent from her 
testimony that she was biased and only justifying her calloused 
act of placing the child for adoption. The testimony of the 
sister of Winifred, Lydia Fleischman, (R. 168-183) hardly 
bolsters the testimony of Winifred, as Lydia's contacts with 
plaintiff and Winifred were too infrequent and the basis for 
her observations too speculative and remote. 
The plaintiff testified convincingly that he loved his child 
dearly and wanted to return with her to Peoria. His testimony 
that he treated the child fairly and with every consideration 
for her health, welfare and happiness is credible, honest and 
forthright. That he exhibited a disciplinary attitude and 
required obedience is not to say that he was unfit or immoral. 
As a general proposition, the legal right of a fit and 
suitable parent to the custody of his child ought not to be 
denied him as against an opposing claimant having no legal 
right to the child (Sherry v. Doyle, 68 Utah 74, 249 Pac. 
250, 48 A.L.R. 131). As pointed out by this Honorable Court 
in Sherry v. Doyle, supra, " * * * it may well be presumed that 
the care and custody of a child, and its interest and welfare, 
will best be subserved under the control of the parent." In 
the same opinion it was further observed: 
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"Unless the plaintiff is immoral or unfit, such asso-
ciation and companionship of the father and the child 
is the right of both and ought not to be denied to 
either. The comforts and benefits of such an association 
with one of the child's own flesh and blood usually are 
far more advantageous than an association with strang-
ers." 
There is nothing in the record to show that the child's 
mental, moral, or physical welfare or her future happiness 
or development will be adversely affected by favoring the 
father in this regard (Baldwin v. Nielson, (Utah, 1946) 174 
P. 2d 437; cf. Walton v. Coffman (Utah, 1946) 169 P. 2d 97). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff rightfully 
and lawfully is entitled to the custody of his minor child, 
Lore Popp, against the defendants who have no daim to cus-
tody; and that plaintiff, as the natural father, is a fit and 
proper person to have the care, control and custody of his 
said child. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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